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\n \n\n \n \n Mohammed Karmoose; Christina Fragouli; Suhas Diggavi; Rafael Misoczki; Lily L Yang; and Zhenliang Zhang.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Using mm-waves for secret key establishment.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Communications Letters, 23(6): 1077–1080. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{karmoose2019using,\n abstract = {The fact that millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication needs to be directional is usually perceived as a challenge; in this letter, we argue that it enables efficient secret key sharing that is unconditionally secure from passive eavesdroppers by building on packet erasures. We showcase the potential of our approach in two setups: 5G networks and vehicle platooning. In both cases, with the right choice of parameters, we can potentially establish keys in the order of tenths of Mb/s. These first results are based on some simplifying assumptions, yet we believe that they give incentives to further explore such techniques.},\n author = {Karmoose, Mohammed and Fragouli, Christina and Diggavi, Suhas and Misoczki, Rafael and Yang, Lily L and Zhang, Zhenliang},\n journal = {IEEE Communications Letters},\n number = {6},\n pages = {1077--1080},\n publisher = {IEEE},\n tags = {journal,WNS,WiNetnew},\n title = {Using mm-waves for secret key establishment},\n type = {2},\n doi = {10.1109/LCOMM.2019.2909918},\n volume = {23},\n year = {2019}\n}\n\n
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\n The fact that millimeter-wave (mmWave) communication needs to be directional is usually perceived as a challenge; in this letter, we argue that it enables efficient secret key sharing that is unconditionally secure from passive eavesdroppers by building on packet erasures. We showcase the potential of our approach in two setups: 5G networks and vehicle platooning. In both cases, with the right choice of parameters, we can potentially establish keys in the order of tenths of Mb/s. These first results are based on some simplifying assumptions, yet we believe that they give incentives to further explore such techniques.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Manoj Mishra; Bikash Kumar Dey; Vinod M Prabhakaran; and Suhas N Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Wiretapped Oblivious Transfer.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 63(4): 2560–2595. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{mishra2017wiretapped,\n author = {Mishra, Manoj and Dey, Bikash Kumar and Prabhakaran, Vinod M and Diggavi, Suhas N},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},\n number = {4},\n pages = {2560--2595},\n publisher = {IEEE},\n tags = {journal,IT,WNS},\n title = {Wiretapped Oblivious Transfer},\n type = {2},\n volume = {63},\n year = {2017}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Mahdi Jafari Siavoshani; Shaunak Mishra; Christina Fragouli; and Suhas N Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Multi-Party Secret Key Agreement Over State-Dependent Wireless Broadcast Channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 12(2): 323–337. 2017.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{siavoshani2017multi,\n author = {Siavoshani, Mahdi Jafari and Mishra, Shaunak and Fragouli, Christina and Diggavi, Suhas N},\n file = {:papers:siavoshani_secretkey.pdf},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security},\n number = {2},\n pages = {323--337},\n publisher = {IEEE},\n tags = {journal,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {Multi-Party Secret Key Agreement Over State-Dependent Wireless Broadcast Channels},\n type = {2},\n volume = {12},\n year = {2017}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n László Czap; Vinod M Prabhakaran; Christina Fragouli; and Suhas N Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n An LP Characterization of the Secret-message Capacity of Three Erasure Networks With Feedback.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 62(5): 2430–2480. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{czap2016lp,\n author = {Czap, L{\\'a}szl{\\'o} and Prabhakaran, Vinod M and Fragouli, Christina and Diggavi, Suhas N},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},\n number = {5},\n pages = {2430--2480},\n publisher = {IEEE},\n tags = {journal,IT,WNS},\n title = {An LP Characterization of the Secret-message Capacity of Three Erasure Networks With Feedback},\n type = {2},\n volume = {62},\n year = {2016}\n}\n\n
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@article{czap2015secure,\n author = {Czap, L{\\'a}szl{\\'o} and Fragouli, Christina and Prabhakaran, Vinod M and Diggavi, Suhas},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},\n number = {4},\n pages = {1667--1686},\n publisher = {IEEE},\n tags = {journal,IT,WNS},\n title = {Secure network coding with erasures and feedback},\n type = {2},\n doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2015.2402272},\n volume = {61},\n year = {2015}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Christina Fragouli; Vinod M. Prabhakaran; László Czap; and Suhas N. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Wireless Network Security: Building on Erasures.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the IEEE, 103(10): 1826–1840. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{DBLP:journals/pieee/FragouliPCD15,\n author = {Christina Fragouli and\nVinod M. Prabhakaran and\nL{\\'{a}}szl{\\'{o}} Czap and\nSuhas N. Diggavi},\n bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org},\n biburl = {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/journals/pieee/FragouliPCD15},\n file = {:papers:winetsec_boe.pdf},\n journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE},\n number = {10},\n pages = {1826--1840},\n tags = {journal,WiNetSec,IT},\n timestamp = {Tue, 22 Sep 2015 10:37:29 +0200},\n title = {Wireless Network Security: Building on Erasures},\n type = {2},\n doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2015.2438312},\n volume = {103},\n year = {2015}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n László Czap; Vinod M. Prabhakaran; Christina Fragouli; and Suhas N. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Secret Communication Over Broadcast Erasure Channels With State-Feedback.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 61(9): 4788–4808. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Secret arxiv\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{DBLP:journals/tit/CzapPFD15,\n abstract = {We consider a 1-to-K communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to K receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each transmission. We explore the achievable rate region when we require that the message to each receiver remains secret - in the information theoretical sense - from all the other receivers. We characterize the capacity of secure communication in all the cases where the capacity of the 1-to-K communication scenario without the requirement of security is known. As a special case, we characterize the secret-message capacity of a single receiver point-to-point erasure channel with public state-feedback in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. \nWe find that in all cases where we have an exact characterization, we can achieve the capacity by using linear complexity two-phase schemes: in the first phase we create appropriate secret keys, and in the second phase we use them to encrypt each message. We find that the amount of key we need is smaller than the size of the message, and equal to the amount of encrypted message the potential eavesdroppers jointly collect. Moreover, we prove that a dishonest receiver that provides deceptive feedback cannot diminish the rate experienced by the honest receivers. \nWe also develop a converse proof which reflects the two-phase structure of our achievability scheme. As a side result, our technique leads to a new outer bound proof for the non-secure communication problem.},\n author = {L{\\'{a}}szl{\\'{o}} Czap and\nVinod M. Prabhakaran and\nChristina Fragouli and\nSuhas N. Diggavi},\n bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org},\n biburl = {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/journals/tit/CzapPFD15},\n doi = {10.1109/TIT.2015.2449838},\n file = {:papers:SecretCom_Czap.pdf},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},\n number = {9},\n pages = {4788--4808},\n tags = {journal,WiNetSec,IT},\n timestamp = {Thu, 20 Aug 2015 14:54:38 +0200},\n title = {Secret Communication Over Broadcast Erasure Channels With State-Feedback},\n type = {2},\n url_arxiv = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1800},\n volume = {61},\n year = {2015}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider a 1-to-K communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to K receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each transmission. We explore the achievable rate region when we require that the message to each receiver remains secret - in the information theoretical sense - from all the other receivers. We characterize the capacity of secure communication in all the cases where the capacity of the 1-to-K communication scenario without the requirement of security is known. As a special case, we characterize the secret-message capacity of a single receiver point-to-point erasure channel with public state-feedback in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We find that in all cases where we have an exact characterization, we can achieve the capacity by using linear complexity two-phase schemes: in the first phase we create appropriate secret keys, and in the second phase we use them to encrypt each message. We find that the amount of key we need is smaller than the size of the message, and equal to the amount of encrypted message the potential eavesdroppers jointly collect. Moreover, we prove that a dishonest receiver that provides deceptive feedback cannot diminish the rate experienced by the honest receivers. We also develop a converse proof which reflects the two-phase structure of our achievability scheme. As a side result, our technique leads to a new outer bound proof for the non-secure communication problem.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Manoj Mishra; Bikash Kumar Dey; Vinod M Prabhakaran; and Suhas Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On the oblivious transfer capacity of the degraded wiretapped binary erasure channel.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages 1169–1173, 2015. IEEE\n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{mishra2015oblivious,\n author = {Mishra, Manoj and Dey, Bikash Kumar and Prabhakaran, Vinod M and Diggavi, Suhas},\n booktitle = {2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)},\n organization = {IEEE},\n pages = {1169--1173},\n tags = {conf,IT,WNS},\n title = {On the oblivious transfer capacity of the degraded wiretapped binary erasure channel},\n type = {4},\n year = {2015}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Triangle network secrecy.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory (ISIT), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 781-785, June 2014. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6874939,\n abstract = {We characterize the secret message capacity of the triangle network, that consists of a source, a relay and a destination connected through orthogonal erasure channels. A passive eavesdropper, Eve, wiretaps any one of the three channels. The source and the relay can each generate unlimited private randomness; the relay and the destination can publicly provide strictly causal channel state information. Our achievable scheme is expressed through a linear program (LP) with 11 inequalities that captures a minimal set of secret key generation methods and the use of them for message encryption. Our outer bound is expressed also through a linear program, in this case with 41 constraints, constructed from general information inequalities. We prove that the optimal value of the outer bound LP is no larger than that of the scheme LP, which implies that the solution of the achievable scheme LP is the capacity. We find that equipping the relay with private randomness increases the secrecy rate by more than 40\\% in some cases and that cut-set bounds, directly applied in the network, are not always tight. Because the derivation of the inner and outer bound are both lengthy, we describe in this paper the achievability scheme, outline the outer bound, and provide the full derivations online [1]. We also make available Matlab functions that take as input the erasure probabilities and evaluate the inner and outer bounds.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory (ISIT), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2014.6874939},\n file = {:papers:tri_net_sec.pdf},\n month = {June},\n pages = {781-785},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Triangle network secrecy},\n type = {4},\n year = {2014}\n}\n\n
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\n We characterize the secret message capacity of the triangle network, that consists of a source, a relay and a destination connected through orthogonal erasure channels. A passive eavesdropper, Eve, wiretaps any one of the three channels. The source and the relay can each generate unlimited private randomness; the relay and the destination can publicly provide strictly causal channel state information. Our achievable scheme is expressed through a linear program (LP) with 11 inequalities that captures a minimal set of secret key generation methods and the use of them for message encryption. Our outer bound is expressed also through a linear program, in this case with 41 constraints, constructed from general information inequalities. We prove that the optimal value of the outer bound LP is no larger than that of the scheme LP, which implies that the solution of the achievable scheme LP is the capacity. We find that equipping the relay with private randomness increases the secrecy rate by more than 40% in some cases and that cut-set bounds, directly applied in the network, are not always tight. Because the derivation of the inner and outer bound are both lengthy, we describe in this paper the achievability scheme, outline the outer bound, and provide the full derivations online [1]. We also make available Matlab functions that take as input the erasure probabilities and evaluate the inner and outer bounds.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n M. Mishra; B.K. Dey; V.M. Prabhakaran; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n The oblivious transfer capacity of the wiretapped binary erasure channel.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory (ISIT), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 1539-1543, June 2014. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"The arxiv\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6875091,\n abstract = {We consider oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve when there is a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the secrecy constraints of Alice and Bob, Eve should not learn the private data of Alice and Bob. When the broadcast channel consists of two independent binary erasure channels, we derive the oblivious transfer capacity for both 2-privacy (where the eavesdropper may collude with either party) and 1-privacy (where there are no collusions).},\n author = {Mishra, M. and Dey, B.K. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory (ISIT), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875091},\n month = {June},\n pages = {1539-1543},\n tags = {conf,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {The oblivious transfer capacity of the wiretapped binary erasure channel},\n type = {4},\n url_arxiv = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.6614},\n year = {2014}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve when there is a broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve. In addition to the secrecy constraints of Alice and Bob, Eve should not learn the private data of Alice and Bob. When the broadcast channel consists of two independent binary erasure channels, we derive the oblivious transfer capacity for both 2-privacy (where the eavesdropper may collude with either party) and 1-privacy (where there are no collusions).\n
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\n \n\n \n \n M. Mishra; B. Dey; V. Prabhakaran; and S.N. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On the oblivious transfer capacity region of the binary erasure broadcast channel.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW) 2014, Nov 2014. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{mishradey14,\n author = {Mishra, M. and Dey, B. and Prabhakaran, V. and Diggavi, S.N.},\n booktitle = {IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW) 2014},\n file = {:papers:isit14_mdpd.pdf},\n month = {Nov},\n tags = {conf,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {On the oblivious transfer capacity region of the binary erasure broadcast channel},\n type = {4},\n year = {2014}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n I Safaka; C. Fragouli; K. Argyraki; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Exchanging pairwise secrets efficiently.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, pages 2265-2273, April 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6567030,\n abstract = {We consider the problem where a group of wireless nodes, connected to the same broadcast domain, want to create pairwise secrets, in the presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to listen in and steal these secrets. Existing solutions assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations (e.g., large-integer factorization) in useful time. We ask the question: can we solve this problem without assuming anything about Eve's computational capabilities? We propose a simple secret-agreement protocol, where the wireless nodes keep exchanging bits until they have agreed on pairwise secrets that Eve cannot reconstruct with very high probability. Our protocol relies on Eve's limited network presence (the fact that she cannot be located at an arbitrary number of points in the network at the same time), but assumes nothing about her computational capabilities. We formally show that, under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure (it leaks zero information to Eve about the secrets). Using a small wireless testbed of smart-phones, we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible for 5 nodes to create thousands of secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent from the adversary's capabilities.},\n author = {Safaka, I and Fragouli, C. and Argyraki, K. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE},\n doi = {10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567030},\n file = {:papers:exchanging_secrets.pdf},\n issn = {0743-166X},\n month = {April},\n pages = {2265-2273},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Exchanging pairwise secrets efficiently},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider the problem where a group of wireless nodes, connected to the same broadcast domain, want to create pairwise secrets, in the presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to listen in and steal these secrets. Existing solutions assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations (e.g., large-integer factorization) in useful time. We ask the question: can we solve this problem without assuming anything about Eve's computational capabilities? We propose a simple secret-agreement protocol, where the wireless nodes keep exchanging bits until they have agreed on pairwise secrets that Eve cannot reconstruct with very high probability. Our protocol relies on Eve's limited network presence (the fact that she cannot be located at an arbitrary number of points in the network at the same time), but assumes nothing about her computational capabilities. We formally show that, under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure (it leaks zero information to Eve about the secrets). Using a small wireless testbed of smart-phones, we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible for 5 nodes to create thousands of secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent from the adversary's capabilities.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Securing broadcast against dishonest receivers.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Network Coding (NetCod), 2013 International Symposium on, pages 1-6, June 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6570819,\n abstract = {Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin do not learn each other's message. In this paper, we assume that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable region for the case when the adversary has complete control on the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of different security notions.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Network Coding (NetCod), 2013 International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/NetCod.2013.6570819},\n file = {:papers:securing_bc.pdf},\n month = {June},\n pages = {1-6},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Securing broadcast against dishonest receivers},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin do not learn each other's message. In this paper, we assume that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable region for the case when the adversary has complete control on the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of different security notions.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n S. Mishra; C. Fragouli; V. Prabhakaran; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Using feedback for secrecy over graphs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 2399-2403, July 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Using arxiv\n  \n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{6620656,\n abstract = {We study the problem of secure message multicasting over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback, facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges, enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries over CCNs.},\n author = {Mishra, S. and Fragouli, C. and Prabhakaran, V. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2013.6620656},\n issn = {2157-8095},\n month = {July},\n pages = {2399-2403},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Using feedback for secrecy over graphs},\n type = {4},\n url_arxiv = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.3051},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We study the problem of secure message multicasting over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback, facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges, enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries over CCNs.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Exploiting common randomness: A resource for network secrecy.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2013 IEEE, pages 1-5, Sept 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{6691232,\n abstract = {We investigate the problem of secure communication in a simple network with three communicating parties, two distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources is restricted to a rate limited common random source they both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels with strictly causal channel state information of the destination available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is optimal in certain special cases.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2013 IEEE},\n doi = {10.1109/ITW.2013.6691232},\n file = {:papers:common_randomness.pdf},\n month = {Sept},\n pages = {1-5},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Exploiting common randomness: A resource for network secrecy},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We investigate the problem of secure communication in a simple network with three communicating parties, two distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources is restricted to a rate limited common random source they both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels with strictly causal channel state information of the destination available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is optimal in certain special cases.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; C. Fragouli; V.M. Prabhakaran; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secure network coding with erasures and feedback.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on, pages 1517-1524, Oct 2013. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{6736707,\n abstract = {Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network links are lossless, thus it can be applied over lossy networks after channel error correction. Yet it is well known that channel losses, such as packet erasures, can be constructively used for secrecy over a link. We address here the challenge of extending these results for arbitrary networks. We provide achievability schemes over erasure networks with feedback, that outperform the alternative approach of channel error correction followed by secure message transmission separation. We derive outer bounds on the securely achievable rate and as a consequence we show optimality of our proposed scheme in some special cases.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Fragouli, C. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on},\n doi = {10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736707},\n file = {:papers:secure_netcod.pdf},\n month = {Oct},\n pages = {1517-1524},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Secure network coding with erasures and feedback},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
\n
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\n Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network links are lossless, thus it can be applied over lossy networks after channel error correction. Yet it is well known that channel losses, such as packet erasures, can be constructively used for secrecy over a link. We address here the challenge of extending these results for arbitrary networks. We provide achievability schemes over erasure networks with feedback, that outperform the alternative approach of channel error correction followed by secure message transmission separation. We derive outer bounds on the securely achievable rate and as a consequence we show optimality of our proposed scheme in some special cases.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Katerina Argyraki; Suhas Diggavi; Melissa Duarte; Christina Fragouli; Marios Gatzianas; and Panagiotis Kostopoulos.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Creating secrets out of erasures.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing & networking, pages 429–440, Sep 2013. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{argyraki2013creating,\n abstract = {Current security systems often rely on the adversary's computational limitations. Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies on the adversary's limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We present a system that leverages this opportunity to enable n wireless nodes to create a shared secret S, in a way that an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains very little information on S. Our system consists of two steps: (1) The nodes transmit packets following a special pattern, such that Eve learns very little about a given fraction of the transmitted packets. This is achieved through a combination of beam forming (from many different sources) and wiretap codes. (2) The nodes participate in a protocol that reshuffles the information known to each node, such that the nodes end up sharing a secret that Eve knows very little about. Our protocol is easily implementable in existing wireless devices and scales well with the number of nodes; these properties are achieved through a combination of public feedback, broadcasting, and network coding. We evaluate our system through a 5-node testbed. We demonstrate that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.},\n author = {Argyraki, Katerina and Diggavi, Suhas and Duarte, Melissa and Fragouli, Christina and Gatzianas, Marios and Kostopoulos, Panagiotis},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing \\& networking},\n file = {:papers:creating_secrets.pdf},\n month = {Sep},\n organization = {ACM},\n pages = {429--440},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Creating secrets out of erasures},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n Current security systems often rely on the adversary's computational limitations. Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies on the adversary's limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We present a system that leverages this opportunity to enable n wireless nodes to create a shared secret S, in a way that an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains very little information on S. Our system consists of two steps: (1) The nodes transmit packets following a special pattern, such that Eve learns very little about a given fraction of the transmitted packets. This is achieved through a combination of beam forming (from many different sources) and wiretap codes. (2) The nodes participate in a protocol that reshuffles the information known to each node, such that the nodes end up sharing a secret that Eve knows very little about. Our protocol is easily implementable in existing wireless devices and scales well with the number of nodes; these properties are achieved through a combination of public feedback, broadcasting, and network coding. We evaluate our system through a 5-node testbed. We demonstrate that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.\n
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\n  \n 2012\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n A Khisti; S.N. Diggavi; and Gregory W. Wornell.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secret-Key Generation Using Correlated Sources and Channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 58(2): 652-670. Feb 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{kdw_j11,\n abstract = {We study the secret-key capacity in a joint source-channel coding setup-the terminals are connected over a discrete memoryless channel and have access to side information, modelled as a pair of discrete memoryless source sequences. As our main result, we establish the upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity. In the lower bound expression, the equivocation terms of the source and channel components are functionally additive even though the coding scheme generates a single secret-key by jointly taking into account the source and channel equivocations. Our bounds coincide, thus establishing the capacity, when the underlying wiretap channel can be decomposed into a set of independent, parallel, and reversely degraded channels. For the case of parallel Gaussian channels and jointly Gaussian sources we show that Gaussian codebooks achieve the secret-key capacity. In addition, when the eavesdropper also observes a correlated side information sequence, we establish the secret-key capacity when both the source and channel of the eavesdropper are a degraded version of the legitimate receiver. We finally also treat the case when a public discussion channel is available, propose a separation based coding scheme, and establish its optimality when the channel output symbols of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are conditionally independent given the input.},\n author = {Khisti, A and Diggavi, S.N. and Wornell, Gregory W.},\n doi = {10.1109/TIT.2011.2173629},\n file = {:papers:secret_keygen.pdf},\n issn = {0018-9448},\n journal = {Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on},\n label = {kdw_j11},\n month = {Feb},\n number = {2},\n pages = {652-670},\n tags = {journal,ITsecrecy,KeyGen,IT,WiNetSec,SrcChanSec},\n title = {Secret-Key Generation Using Correlated Sources and Channels},\n type = {2},\n volume = {58},\n year = {2012}\n}\n\n
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\n We study the secret-key capacity in a joint source-channel coding setup-the terminals are connected over a discrete memoryless channel and have access to side information, modelled as a pair of discrete memoryless source sequences. As our main result, we establish the upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity. In the lower bound expression, the equivocation terms of the source and channel components are functionally additive even though the coding scheme generates a single secret-key by jointly taking into account the source and channel equivocations. Our bounds coincide, thus establishing the capacity, when the underlying wiretap channel can be decomposed into a set of independent, parallel, and reversely degraded channels. For the case of parallel Gaussian channels and jointly Gaussian sources we show that Gaussian codebooks achieve the secret-key capacity. In addition, when the eavesdropper also observes a correlated side information sequence, we establish the secret-key capacity when both the source and channel of the eavesdropper are a degraded version of the legitimate receiver. We finally also treat the case when a public discussion channel is available, propose a separation based coding scheme, and establish its optimality when the channel output symbols of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are conditionally independent given the input.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On interactive secrecy over erasure networks.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Communications Control and Signal Processing (ISCCSP), 2012 5th International Symposium on, pages 1-4, May 2012. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6217871,\n abstract = {In this short review paper we summarize some of our recent results on interactive message secrecy for broadcast erasure channels.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Communications Control and Signal Processing (ISCCSP), 2012 5th International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISCCSP.2012.6217871},\n file = {:papers:interactive_secrecy.pdf},\n month = {May},\n pages = {1-4},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec},\n title = {On interactive secrecy over erasure networks},\n type = {4},\n year = {2012}\n}\n\n
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\n In this short review paper we summarize some of our recent results on interactive message secrecy for broadcast erasure channels.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Broadcasting private messages securely.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2012 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 428-432, July 2012. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6284224,\n abstract = {Consider a source, Alice, broadcasting private messages to multiple receivers through a broadcast erasure channel; users send back to Alice public feedback that she causally uses to decide the coding strategy for her following transmissions. Recently, the multiple unicast capacity region for this problem has been exactly characterized for a number of special cases; namely the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user, and one-sidedly fair K-user [1], [2]. In this paper, we show that for all the cases where such characterizations exist, we can also optimally characterize the “secure” communication rates, where the message that Alice transmits to each user is information theoretically secure from the other users, even if these collude. We show that a simple, two-phase strategy, where appropriate amounts of secret keys are first generated and then consumed, matches a new outer bound we derive.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2012 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2012.6284224},\n file = {:papers:bc_private_msg.pdf},\n issn = {2157-8095},\n month = {July},\n pages = {428-432},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Broadcasting private messages securely},\n type = {4},\n year = {2012}\n}\n\n
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\n Consider a source, Alice, broadcasting private messages to multiple receivers through a broadcast erasure channel; users send back to Alice public feedback that she causally uses to decide the coding strategy for her following transmissions. Recently, the multiple unicast capacity region for this problem has been exactly characterized for a number of special cases; namely the 2-user, 3-user, symmetric K-user, and one-sidedly fair K-user [1], [2]. In this paper, we show that for all the cases where such characterizations exist, we can also optimally characterize the “secure” communication rates, where the message that Alice transmits to each user is information theoretically secure from the other users, even if these collude. We show that a simple, two-phase strategy, where appropriate amounts of secret keys are first generated and then consumed, matches a new outer bound we derive.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n Iris Safaka; Christina Fragouli; Katerina Argyraki; and Suhas Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Creating shared secrets out of thin air.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, pages 73–78, Oct 2012. ACM\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
\n
@inproceedings{safaka2012creating,\n abstract = {Current security systems typically rely on the adversary's computational limitations (e.g., the fact that it cannot invert a hash function or perform large-integer factorization). Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies not on the adversary's computational limitations, but on its limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We take a first step toward designing and building a wireless security system that leverages this opportunity: We consider the problem where a group of n nodes, connected to the same broadcast wireless network, want to agree on a shared secret (e.g., an encryption key), in the presence of an adversary Eve who tries to listen in and steal the secret. We propose a secret-agreement protocol, where the n nodes of the group keep exchanging bits until they have all agreed on a bit sequence that Eve cannot reconstruct (with very high probability). We provide experimental evidence---to the best of our knowledge, the first one---that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.},\n author = {Safaka, Iris and Fragouli, Christina and Argyraki, Katerina and Diggavi, Suhas},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 11th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks},\n file = {:papers:secrets_thin_air.pdf},\n month = {Oct},\n organization = {ACM},\n pages = {73--78},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Creating shared secrets out of thin air},\n type = {4},\n year = {2012}\n}\n\n
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\n Current security systems typically rely on the adversary's computational limitations (e.g., the fact that it cannot invert a hash function or perform large-integer factorization). Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies not on the adversary's computational limitations, but on its limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We take a first step toward designing and building a wireless security system that leverages this opportunity: We consider the problem where a group of n nodes, connected to the same broadcast wireless network, want to agree on a shared secret (e.g., an encryption key), in the presence of an adversary Eve who tries to listen in and steal the secret. We propose a secret-agreement protocol, where the n nodes of the group keep exchanging bits until they have all agreed on a bit sequence that Eve cannot reconstruct (with very high probability). We provide experimental evidence—to the best of our knowledge, the first one—that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.\n
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\n  \n 2011\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n A. Khisti; S N. Diggavi; and G W. Wornell.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Secret-key agreement over wiretap channels with random state parameters.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 6: 672-681. Sep 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n \"Secret-key arxiv\n  \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@article{KDWj10,\n author = {A. Khisti and S N. Diggavi and G W. Wornell},\n journal = {IEEE Transactions  on Information Forensics and Security},\n month = {Sep},\n note = {},\n pages = {672-681},\n tags = {journal,ITsecrecy,KeyGen,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {Secret-key agreement over wiretap channels with random state parameters},\n type = {2},\n url_arxiv = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.3052},\n volume = {6},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n M.J. Siavoshani; S. Mishra; S.N. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Group secret key agreement over state-dependent wireless broadcast channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 1960-1964, July 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6033895,\n abstract = {We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K, using a state-dependent wireless broadcast channel that exists from one of the honest nodes to the rest of the nodes including a passive eavesdropper Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free and unlimited rate public channel which is also observed by Eve. For this setup, we develop an information-theoretically secure secret key agreement protocol. We show the optimality of this protocol for linear deterministic wireless broadcast channels as well as in the high-SNR regime for wireless channels with large dynamic range over channel states.},\n author = {Siavoshani, M.J. and Mishra, S. and Diggavi, S.N. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2011.6033895},\n file = {:papers:group_secret_key.pdf},\n issn = {2157-8095},\n month = {July},\n pages = {1960-1964},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Group secret key agreement over state-dependent wireless broadcast channels},\n type = {4},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K, using a state-dependent wireless broadcast channel that exists from one of the honest nodes to the rest of the nodes including a passive eavesdropper Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free and unlimited rate public channel which is also observed by Eve. For this setup, we develop an information-theoretically secure secret key agreement protocol. We show the optimality of this protocol for linear deterministic wireless broadcast channels as well as in the high-SNR regime for wireless channels with large dynamic range over channel states.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; C. Fragouli; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secret message capacity of erasure broadcast channels with feedback.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2011 IEEE, pages 65-69, Oct 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6089579,\n abstract = {We characterize the secret message capacity of a wiretapped erasure channel where causal channel state information of the honest nodes is publicly available. In doing so, we establish an intimate connection between message secrecy and secret key generation for the same channel setup. We propose a linear coding scheme that has polynomial encoding/decoding complexity, and prove a converse that shows the optimality of our scheme. Our work also demonstrates the value of causal public feedback, which has previously been shown for the secret key generation problem.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Fragouli, C. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2011 IEEE},\n file = {:papers:secret_erasure_bc.pdf},\n month = {Oct},\n pages = {65-69},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Secret message capacity of erasure broadcast channels with feedback},\n type = {4},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n
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\n We characterize the secret message capacity of a wiretapped erasure channel where causal channel state information of the honest nodes is publicly available. In doing so, we establish an intimate connection between message secrecy and secret key generation for the same channel setup. We propose a linear coding scheme that has polynomial encoding/decoding complexity, and prove a converse that shows the optimality of our scheme. Our work also demonstrates the value of causal public feedback, which has previously been shown for the secret key generation problem.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n S. Mohajer; S.N. Diggavi; H.V. Poor; and S. Shamai.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On the parallel relay wire-tap network.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on, pages 418-425, Sept 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6120197,\n abstract = {Information-theoretic secrecy is studied for a parallel relay (diamond) network, in which a transmitter wishes to communicate to a receiver through two relay nodes. While there is no direct link between the transmitter and receiver and all flow of information has to be transmitted through the relays, the message has to be kept secret from each of them. The exact secrecy capacity is characterized for the network under the linear deterministic model. The problem is then studied when each terminal is equipped with multiple antennas, and the channels are parallel Gaussian links. Lower and upper bounds for the secrecy capacity are derived, and the gap is bounded by a constant independent of the channel parameters and SNR. This results in an approximate characterization for the secrecy capacity of the parallel Gaussian diamond network.},\n author = {Mohajer, S. and Diggavi, S.N. and Poor, H.V. and Shamai, S.},\n booktitle = {Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on},\n doi = {10.1109/Allerton.2011.6120197},\n file = {:papers:parallel_wiretap.pdf},\n month = {Sept},\n pages = {418-425},\n tags = {conf,IT,WiNetSec,WiNet},\n title = {On the parallel relay wire-tap network},\n type = {4},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n
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\n Information-theoretic secrecy is studied for a parallel relay (diamond) network, in which a transmitter wishes to communicate to a receiver through two relay nodes. While there is no direct link between the transmitter and receiver and all flow of information has to be transmitted through the relays, the message has to be kept secret from each of them. The exact secrecy capacity is characterized for the network under the linear deterministic model. The problem is then studied when each terminal is equipped with multiple antennas, and the channels are parallel Gaussian links. Lower and upper bounds for the secrecy capacity are derived, and the gap is bounded by a constant independent of the channel parameters and SNR. This results in an approximate characterization for the secrecy capacity of the parallel Gaussian diamond network.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n A Khisti; and S.N. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n A remark on secret-key generation over correlated fading channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps), 2011 IEEE, pages 864-868, Dec 2011. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{6162578,\n abstract = {We study secret-key agreement with public discussion over a flat-fading wiretap channel model. The fading gains are correlated across the receivers and sampled independently at each time. Perfect receiver channel state information (CSI) is assumed, whereas a noisy CSI of the main channel is also available to the transmitter. We propose lower and upper bounds on the capacity. Our lower bound is achieved by a coding scheme that involves a separate binning of the receiver CSI sequence and its channel output sequence. In general it improves upon the joint-binning schemes considered in earlier works. Our upper and lower bounds coincide, establishing the capacity, when either the transmitter has no CSI or when the channel gains of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are statistically independent.},\n author = {Khisti, A and Diggavi, S.N.},\n booktitle = {GLOBECOM Workshops (GC Wkshps), 2011 IEEE},\n doi = {10.1109/GLOCOMW.2011.6162578},\n file = {:papers:remark_secret_keygen.pdf},\n month = {Dec},\n pages = {864-868},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {A remark on secret-key generation over correlated fading channels},\n type = {4},\n year = {2011}\n}\n\n
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\n We study secret-key agreement with public discussion over a flat-fading wiretap channel model. The fading gains are correlated across the receivers and sampled independently at each time. Perfect receiver channel state information (CSI) is assumed, whereas a noisy CSI of the main channel is also available to the transmitter. We propose lower and upper bounds on the capacity. Our lower bound is achieved by a coding scheme that involves a separate binning of the receiver CSI sequence and its channel output sequence. In general it improves upon the joint-binning schemes considered in earlier works. Our upper and lower bounds coincide, establishing the capacity, when either the transmitter has no CSI or when the channel gains of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are statistically independent.\n
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\n  \n 2010\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n M.J. Siavoshani; C. Fragouli; S. Diggavi; U. Pulleti; and K. Argyraki.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Group secret key generation over broadcast erasure channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR), 2010 Conference Record of the Forty Fourth Asilomar Conference on, pages 719-723, Nov 2010. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n  \n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{5757657,\n abstract = {We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless channel in the presence an eavesdropper Eve. We assume an erasure broadcast channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free public channel which is observed by Eve. For this setup we characterize the secret key generation capacity and propose an achievability scheme that is computationally efficient and employs techniques from network coding. Surprisingly, whether we have m = 2 nodes, or an arbitrary number m of nodes, we can establish a shared secret key among them at the same rate, independently of m.},\n author = {Siavoshani, M.J. and Fragouli, C. and Diggavi, S. and Pulleti, U. and Argyraki, K.},\n booktitle = {Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR), 2010 Conference Record of the Forty Fourth Asilomar Conference on},\n doi = {10.1109/ACSSC.2010.5757657},\n issn = {1058-6393},\n month = {Nov},\n pages = {719-723},\n tags = {conf,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {Group secret key generation over broadcast erasure channels},\n type = {4},\n year = {2010}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider a group of m trusted nodes that aim to create a shared secret key K over a wireless channel in the presence an eavesdropper Eve. We assume an erasure broadcast channel from one of the honest nodes to the rest of them including Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free public channel which is observed by Eve. For this setup we characterize the secret key generation capacity and propose an achievability scheme that is computationally efficient and employs techniques from network coding. Surprisingly, whether we have m = 2 nodes, or an arbitrary number m of nodes, we can establish a shared secret key among them at the same rate, independently of m.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n A. Khisti; S N. Diggavi; and G W. Wornell.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secret key agreement using asymmetry in channel state knowledge.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Seoul, Korea, pages 2286–2290, June 2009. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{KTWj09,\n author = {A. Khisti and S N. Diggavi and G W. Wornell},\n booktitle = {IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Seoul, Korea},\n month = {June},\n note = {},\n pages = {2286--2290},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,KeyGen,IT,WiNetSec},\n title = {Secret key agreement using asymmetry in channel state knowledge},\n type = {4},\n year = {2009}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n E. Perron; S N. Diggavi; and E. Telatar.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On noise insertion strategies for wireless network secrecy.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Information Theory and Applications workshop (ITA), UCSD, San Diego, California, pages 77–84, February 2009. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{PDTc09d,\n abstract = {This paper studies the idea of noise insertion by authenticated relays through friendly jamming. We develop the secrecy rate achievable in arbitrary (deterministic) networks when there are relays actively helping secrecy.},\n author = {E. Perron and S N. Diggavi and E. Telatar,},\n booktitle = {Information Theory and Applications workshop (ITA), UCSD, San Diego, California},\n file = {:papers:pdtita09final.pdf},\n label = {pdtc09d},\n month = {February},\n note = {},\n pages = {77--84},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,IT,WiNetSec,WiNetInfFlow,ITapprox,WiNet},\n title = {On noise insertion strategies for wireless network secrecy},\n type = {4},\n year = {2009}\n}\n\n
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\n This paper studies the idea of noise insertion by authenticated relays through friendly jamming. We develop the secrecy rate achievable in arbitrary (deterministic) networks when there are relays actively helping secrecy.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n E. Perron; S N. Diggavi; and I E. Telatar.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n On cooperative wireless network secrecy.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In IEEE INFOCOM 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 2009. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{PDTp09,\n abstract = {In this paper we consider\nsecret communication between two special nodes (“source” and\n“destination”) in a wireless network with authenticated relays:\nthe message communicated to the destination is to be kept\ninformation-theoretically (unconditionally) secret from any eavesdropper\nwithin a class. Since the transmissions are broadcast and\ninterfere with each other, complex signal interactions occur. We\ndevelop cooperative schemes which utilize these interactions in\nwireless communication over networks with arbitrary topology,\nand give provable unconditional secrecy guarantees.},\n author = {E. Perron and S N. Diggavi and I E. Telatar},\n booktitle = {IEEE INFOCOM 2009, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil},\n file = {:papers:pdtwireless_net_secrecy08.pdf},\n label = {pdt_c09a},\n month = {April},\n note = {},\n pages = {},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,IT,WiNetSec,WiNetInfFlow,WiNet,SelConf},\n title = {On cooperative wireless network secrecy},\n type = {4},\n year = {2009}\n}\n\n
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\n In this paper we consider secret communication between two special nodes (“source” and “destination”) in a wireless network with authenticated relays: the message communicated to the destination is to be kept information-theoretically (unconditionally) secret from any eavesdropper within a class. Since the transmissions are broadcast and interfere with each other, complex signal interactions occur. We develop cooperative schemes which utilize these interactions in wireless communication over networks with arbitrary topology, and give provable unconditional secrecy guarantees.\n
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\n \n\n \n \n E. Perron; S N. Diggavi; and I E. Telatar.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n A multiple access approach for the compound wiretap channel.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Taormina, Italy, pages 11–15, October 2009. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{PDTp09a,\n abstract = {The compound wiretap channel generalizes the\nclassical problem in broadcast information-theoretic secrecy by\nallowing a class of potential eavesdroppers. In this paper we\npresent a new coding scheme that generalizes known approaches\nto this problem. The scheme prefixes an artificial multiple\naccess channel to the transmission scheme in order to design a\nstructured transmit codebook. The idea is that such a structure\ncan potentially increase the perfect secrecy rate for the legitimate\nusers in the presence of the class of eavesdroppers.},\n author = {E. Perron and S N. Diggavi and I E. Telatar},\n booktitle = {IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Taormina, Italy},\n file = {:papers:pdt09mac_wiretap.pdf},\n month = {October},\n note = {},\n pages = {11--15},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,IT,WiNetSec,SelConf},\n title = {A multiple access approach for the compound wiretap channel},\n type = {4},\n year = {2009}\n}\n\n
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\n The compound wiretap channel generalizes the classical problem in broadcast information-theoretic secrecy by allowing a class of potential eavesdroppers. In this paper we present a new coding scheme that generalizes known approaches to this problem. The scheme prefixes an artificial multiple access channel to the transmission scheme in order to design a structured transmit codebook. The idea is that such a structure can potentially increase the perfect secrecy rate for the legitimate users in the presence of the class of eavesdroppers.\n
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\n  \n 2008\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n
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\n \n\n \n \n A. Khisti; S N. Diggavi; and G W. Wornell.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secret key generation with correlated sources and noisy channels.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Toronto, Canada, pages 1005–1009, July 2008. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{KDWj08,\n author = {A. Khisti and S N. Diggavi and G W. Wornell,},\n booktitle = {IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), Toronto, Canada},\n month = {July},\n note = {},\n pages = {1005--1009},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,KeyGen,IT,WiNetSec,SrcChanSec},\n title = {Secret key generation with correlated sources and noisy channels},\n type = {4},\n year = {2008}\n}\n\n
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\n \n\n \n \n E. Perron; S N. Diggavi; and E. Telatar.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Wireless network secrecy with public feedback.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Proceedings of Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Illinois, pages 753–760, September 2008. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n  \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n  \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n  \n \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{PDTj08,\n abstract = {We study a line network with an eavesdropper having access to the\nrelay transmission. We assume that there could also be a public feedback channel from the destination. We develop achievable strategies to achieve certain rate-equivocation pairs.},\n author = {E. Perron and S N. Diggavi and E. Telatar},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Illinois},\n file = {:papers:pdt_allerton08.pdf},\n month = {September},\n note = {},\n pages = {753--760},\n tags = {conf,ITsecrecy,IT,WiNetSec,WiNetInfFlow,WiNet,InteractiveSec,SelConf},\n title = {Wireless network secrecy with public feedback},\n type = {4},\n year = {2008}\n}\n\n
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\n We study a line network with an eavesdropper having access to the relay transmission. We assume that there could also be a public feedback channel from the destination. We develop achievable strategies to achieve certain rate-equivocation pairs.\n
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