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\n\n \n \n I Safaka; C. Fragouli; K. Argyraki; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Exchanging pairwise secrets efficiently.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, pages 2265-2273, April 2013. \n
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@inproceedings{6567030,\n abstract = {We consider the problem where a group of wireless nodes, connected to the same broadcast domain, want to create pairwise secrets, in the presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to listen in and steal these secrets. Existing solutions assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations (e.g., large-integer factorization) in useful time. We ask the question: can we solve this problem without assuming anything about Eve's computational capabilities? We propose a simple secret-agreement protocol, where the wireless nodes keep exchanging bits until they have agreed on pairwise secrets that Eve cannot reconstruct with very high probability. Our protocol relies on Eve's limited network presence (the fact that she cannot be located at an arbitrary number of points in the network at the same time), but assumes nothing about her computational capabilities. We formally show that, under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure (it leaks zero information to Eve about the secrets). Using a small wireless testbed of smart-phones, we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible for 5 nodes to create thousands of secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent from the adversary's capabilities.},\n author = {Safaka, I and Fragouli, C. and Argyraki, K. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE},\n doi = {10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567030},\n file = {:papers:exchanging_secrets.pdf},\n issn = {0743-166X},\n month = {April},\n pages = {2265-2273},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Exchanging pairwise secrets efficiently},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We consider the problem where a group of wireless nodes, connected to the same broadcast domain, want to create pairwise secrets, in the presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to listen in and steal these secrets. Existing solutions assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations (e.g., large-integer factorization) in useful time. We ask the question: can we solve this problem without assuming anything about Eve's computational capabilities? We propose a simple secret-agreement protocol, where the wireless nodes keep exchanging bits until they have agreed on pairwise secrets that Eve cannot reconstruct with very high probability. Our protocol relies on Eve's limited network presence (the fact that she cannot be located at an arbitrary number of points in the network at the same time), but assumes nothing about her computational capabilities. We formally show that, under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure (it leaks zero information to Eve about the secrets). Using a small wireless testbed of smart-phones, we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible for 5 nodes to create thousands of secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent from the adversary's capabilities.\n
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\n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Securing broadcast against dishonest receivers.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Network Coding (NetCod), 2013 International Symposium on, pages 1-6, June 2013. \n
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@inproceedings{6570819,\n abstract = {Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin do not learn each other's message. In this paper, we assume that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable region for the case when the adversary has complete control on the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of different security notions.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Network Coding (NetCod), 2013 International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/NetCod.2013.6570819},\n file = {:papers:securing_bc.pdf},\n month = {June},\n pages = {1-6},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Securing broadcast against dishonest receivers},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n Consider a sender, Alice, who wants to transmit private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short public feedback from Bob and Calvin. In [1], we assumed that Bob and Calvin provide honest feedback, and characterized the secure capacity region of the private messages under the requirement that Bob and Calvin do not learn each other's message. In this paper, we assume that Bob (or Calvin) may provide dishonest feedback; or even control the input message distributions, as is commonly assumed in cryptography literature. We characterize the capacity region in the case of dishonest adversaries, as well as an achievable region for the case when the adversary has complete control on the distribution of the messages. We also design polynomial time protocols for both cases, that rely on the use of coding techniques to mix and secure the private messages. As a side result, we define an extended notion of semantic security for this problem and using a similar approach to [2], we show the equivalence of different security notions.\n
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\n\n \n \n S. Mishra; C. Fragouli; V. Prabhakaran; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Using feedback for secrecy over graphs.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 2399-2403, July 2013. \n
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@inproceedings{6620656,\n abstract = {We study the problem of secure message multicasting over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback, facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges, enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries over CCNs.},\n author = {Mishra, S. and Fragouli, C. and Prabhakaran, V. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium on},\n doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2013.6620656},\n issn = {2157-8095},\n month = {July},\n pages = {2399-2403},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Using feedback for secrecy over graphs},\n type = {4},\n url_arxiv = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.3051},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We study the problem of secure message multicasting over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback, facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges, enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries over CCNs.\n
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\n\n \n \n L. Czap; V.M. Prabhakaran; S. Diggavi; and C. Fragouli.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Exploiting common randomness: A resource for network secrecy.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2013 IEEE, pages 1-5, Sept 2013. \n
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@inproceedings{6691232,\n abstract = {We investigate the problem of secure communication in a simple network with three communicating parties, two distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources is restricted to a rate limited common random source they both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels with strictly causal channel state information of the destination available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is optimal in certain special cases.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S. and Fragouli, C.},\n booktitle = {Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 2013 IEEE},\n doi = {10.1109/ITW.2013.6691232},\n file = {:papers:common_randomness.pdf},\n month = {Sept},\n pages = {1-5},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Exploiting common randomness: A resource for network secrecy},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n We investigate the problem of secure communication in a simple network with three communicating parties, two distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources is restricted to a rate limited common random source they both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels with strictly causal channel state information of the destination available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is optimal in certain special cases.\n
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\n\n \n \n L. Czap; C. Fragouli; V.M. Prabhakaran; and S. Diggavi.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Secure network coding with erasures and feedback.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on, pages 1517-1524, Oct 2013. \n
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@inproceedings{6736707,\n abstract = {Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network links are lossless, thus it can be applied over lossy networks after channel error correction. Yet it is well known that channel losses, such as packet erasures, can be constructively used for secrecy over a link. We address here the challenge of extending these results for arbitrary networks. We provide achievability schemes over erasure networks with feedback, that outperform the alternative approach of channel error correction followed by secure message transmission separation. We derive outer bounds on the securely achievable rate and as a consequence we show optimality of our proposed scheme in some special cases.},\n author = {Czap, L. and Fragouli, C. and Prabhakaran, V.M. and Diggavi, S.},\n booktitle = {Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on},\n doi = {10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736707},\n file = {:papers:secure_netcod.pdf},\n month = {Oct},\n pages = {1517-1524},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Secure network coding with erasures and feedback},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n Secure network coding assumes that the underlying network links are lossless, thus it can be applied over lossy networks after channel error correction. Yet it is well known that channel losses, such as packet erasures, can be constructively used for secrecy over a link. We address here the challenge of extending these results for arbitrary networks. We provide achievability schemes over erasure networks with feedback, that outperform the alternative approach of channel error correction followed by secure message transmission separation. We derive outer bounds on the securely achievable rate and as a consequence we show optimality of our proposed scheme in some special cases.\n
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\n\n \n \n Katerina Argyraki; Suhas Diggavi; Melissa Duarte; Christina Fragouli; Marios Gatzianas; and Panagiotis Kostopoulos.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n Creating secrets out of erasures.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing & networking, pages 429–440, Sep 2013. ACM\n
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@inproceedings{argyraki2013creating,\n abstract = {Current security systems often rely on the adversary's computational limitations. Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies on the adversary's limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We present a system that leverages this opportunity to enable n wireless nodes to create a shared secret S, in a way that an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains very little information on S. Our system consists of two steps: (1) The nodes transmit packets following a special pattern, such that Eve learns very little about a given fraction of the transmitted packets. This is achieved through a combination of beam forming (from many different sources) and wiretap codes. (2) The nodes participate in a protocol that reshuffles the information known to each node, such that the nodes end up sharing a secret that Eve knows very little about. Our protocol is easily implementable in existing wireless devices and scales well with the number of nodes; these properties are achieved through a combination of public feedback, broadcasting, and network coding. We evaluate our system through a 5-node testbed. We demonstrate that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.},\n author = {Argyraki, Katerina and Diggavi, Suhas and Duarte, Melissa and Fragouli, Christina and Gatzianas, Marios and Kostopoulos, Panagiotis},\n booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing \\& networking},\n file = {:papers:creating_secrets.pdf},\n month = {Sep},\n organization = {ACM},\n pages = {429--440},\n tags = {conf,WiNetSec,IT},\n title = {Creating secrets out of erasures},\n type = {4},\n year = {2013}\n}\n\n
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\n Current security systems often rely on the adversary's computational limitations. Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies on the adversary's limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We present a system that leverages this opportunity to enable n wireless nodes to create a shared secret S, in a way that an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains very little information on S. Our system consists of two steps: (1) The nodes transmit packets following a special pattern, such that Eve learns very little about a given fraction of the transmitted packets. This is achieved through a combination of beam forming (from many different sources) and wiretap codes. (2) The nodes participate in a protocol that reshuffles the information known to each node, such that the nodes end up sharing a secret that Eve knows very little about. Our protocol is easily implementable in existing wireless devices and scales well with the number of nodes; these properties are achieved through a combination of public feedback, broadcasting, and network coding. We evaluate our system through a 5-node testbed. We demonstrate that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.\n
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